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Abstract
The Australian wheat marketing system has been through a number of stages of deregulation in 
recent years. However, the AWB still maintains the monopoly selling rights of Australian wheat 
exports. The AWB and its supporters justify the single desk by arguing that the monopoly power 
enables them to gain a higher price in the export markets. Opposition to the single desk argues 
that Australia does not produce enough wheat to influence prices. The objective of this study is to 
test the market power hypothesis by examining the quantity - price relationship of Australian 
wheat exports and the stability of this relationship over time using annual data from 1961 to 
2000.
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Introduction
Australia  is  the  third  largest  exporter  of  wheat  in  the  world.  Approximately  80%  of 
Australia’s total wheat production is exported, accounting for between 15% and 20% of all 
wheat  traded  in  the  world  market.  With  export  earnings  close  to  3.5  billion  in  1999/00 
(AWB,  2001),  the  importance  of  wheat  exports  to  the  Australian  economy  cannot  be 
understated. However, Australia is a small producer by the world’s standards, accounting for 
only 3 to 4 % of total world production. The export orientation of the Australian wheat 
industry means that its performance is affected by prevailing world wheat market conditions, 
including various forms of government intervention in the domestic and international wheat 
markets. On the other hand, some argue that the single desk status of the Australian Wheat 
Board (AWB) may, to some extent, either reduce the vulnerability to the vagaries of the 
market or increase its influence on the world wheat market.
The general issue that faces the Australian wheat industry is the fluctuating world demand 
and  supply  conditions  that  impact  directly  on  Australian  export  prices.  Additionally,  the 
levels of government intervention in most countries, including Australia, and the ongoing 
review of the single desk status of AWB remain major concerns.
In recent years the marketing system of the Australian wheat industry has been through the 
first stages of deregulation. In 1989, the domestic wheat market was deregulated allowing 
others companies, besides AWB, to trade grain within Australia. In 1999, the AWB was 
privatised and became a grower owned and controlled unlisted public company. In August 
2001  the  AWB  was  listed  on  the  Australian  Stock  exchange.  Further  to  these  steps  in 
deregulation there has been continuing pressure for the AWB to be totally deregulated, this 
means that it is to lose the monopoly selling rights of all wheat exports that it has had for 
over half a century.
The AWB justifies the existence of the monopoly status  by arguing that the single desk 
allows it to gain a higher price in the export markets and provide better returns to growers. 
An important note to make is that several individuals and organizations that are involved in 
the debate dispute all of the advantages of the monopoly selling rights that were put forward 
by AWB (eg Allen Consulting Group, 2000). The research objective of this study is to test 
the  market  power  hypothesis  by  examining  factors  that  influence  the  export  price  of 
Australian  wheat,  particularly  the  amount  of  Australian  wheat  exports,  based  on  an 
econometric model using data from 1961 to 2000. 
The paper is organized as follows. Firstly, it provides an overview of the Australian wheat 
industry. Changes in wheat marketing in Australia, the review of the Wheat Marketing Act 3
1989  and  arguments  for  and  against  the  single  desk  selling  system  are  outlined.  The 
empirical model is then introduced, followed by the presentation of estimated results. These 
results are then discussed and concluding remarks are provided. 
Australian Wheat Market
The Australian wheat industry has been of key importance to the economy during the 20
th
century. At present it contributes $3.5 billion in exports and directly affects more than $6 
billion  in  grain  handling  infrastructure  and  the  36,000  wheat-growing  farms  (Australian 
Financial Review, 2001). However on a world scale Australia is a small producer of wheat. 
Our wheat production only accounts for approximately 3% of total world production. Due to 
our relatively small population, not much grain is consumed within Australia therefore 80% 
of our wheat is exported. The current situation of world wheat market is summaries in Table 
1.
Table 1. World Wheat Production, Trade and Stocks (Millions of Tonnes).
Country 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02
Production
China 100.5 106.4 101 102.2 110.6 123.3 109.7 113.9 102 98
EC 
2 84.8 81.1 85.5 87.7 100 94.7 103.8 96.9 104.4 95
CIS 88.7 82.7 59.6 59.5 63.5 79.4 55.5 64.6 62.7 74.7
India 55.7 56.8 59 65.8 62.6 69.3 65.9 70.8 75.6 68
USA 66.9 65.4 63.2 59.5 62 67.5 69.4 62.7 60.5 53.5
Canada 29.9 27.2 23.2 25 29.8 24.3 24.1 26.9 26.8 24
Australia 16.2 16.9 9 17 23.7 19.4 22.1 25 21.2 20.5
Pakistan 15.7 16.2 15.2 17 16.9 16.7 18.7 17.9 21.1 18.7
Turkey 17.3 16.8 14.7 15.5 16.2 16.2 18.5 16.5 17.5 16
Argentina 9.7 9.2 11.3 9.5 15.9 14.8 11.5 15.3 16 17.8
Others 76 79.4 82.6 82.1 81.2 84.2 87.3 73.9 73.5 81.1
World Total 561.4 558.1 524.3 540.6 582.4 609.8 586.5 584.4 581.3 567.3
Exports
USA 37.1 32.9 32.4 33.6 26.5 28 29.8 29.8 28.5 28.54
Canada 21.6 18.2 21.3 17 17.9 21.2 14 18.4 17 17
Australia 9.5 12.8 7.9 12.1 17.9 15 16.1 17.3 16.5 16.5
EC 
2 22.7 19.1 16.1 12.6 17 13.1 13.7 16.7 14.5 12.5
Argentina 7.3 4.5 7.9 4.4 10.3 9.6 8.9 10.8 11.5 12.5
Imports
Egypt 6.2 5.9 6.2 6.1 6.9 7.2 7.4 6.2 6 6.1
Japan 5.9 6 5.7 5.9 6 5.7 5.7 6 5.8 5.8
Brazil --* -- 6.5 5.5 5.9 5.9 7.3 7.1 7.5 7
Iran -- -- 3.3 2.8 7.1 3.6 2.5 7.2 7 6
Pakistan -- -- 2 1.9 3.1 3.6 3.1 1.8 0.1 0.5
Indonesia -- -- 3.3 3.5 4.2 3.7 3.2 3.8 3.8 4
South 
Korea
-- -- 4.1 2.4 3.4 3.6 5 3.8 3.5 3.7
CIS 18.5 6.2 3.8 3.6 2.5 2.2 4.5 9 5.3 4.7
China 6.7 4.5 10.1 12.6 8 1.9 0.8 1 0.4 2
Stocks
World Total 55 47.4 34.4 34.2 36.2 41 56.6 51.5 50.9 39
* Figures not available.
Source: International Grains Council, 1998.
Australian wheat production has been on an upward trend since 1960 and has been fairly 
erratic, as can be seen by several large peeks and troughs in Figure 1. These changes in 
production are due to changes in weather conditions and prices.
 In terms of prices, it can be seen from Figure 2 that wheat prices tended to fluctuate. What is 
more striking is that up until 1973 wheat prices were fairly stable, but since then they have 
become rather volatile. The structural change was the result of the oil crisis, grain embargos 
and the formation of the European Union in the early 1970s. 
The increased volatility of world wheat prices post 1973 has meant that the Australian farmer 
and other wheat growers around the world face a greater price risk. The Australian wheat 
farmers have generally relied upon the AWB national pool to manage the price risk. 5
The  closing  stocks  of  Australian  wheat  are  shown  in  Figure  3.  The  closing  stocks  of 
Australian wheat also have been very erratic over the last 40 years and are more so than the 
world’s or the exporters’ total closing stocks that are shown in Figure 4.
Despite the drastic changes in stocks from year to year, the stock to use ratio for world wheat 
has been on a downward trend since 1960, as can be seen in Figure 5. This means that there 
is no longer as much wheat stocks in the world relative to the amount being consumed, which 
helps contribute to price instability. Stocks of any storable commodity tend to stabilize prices 
(Tomek and Robinson, 1991).
Australia exports about 80% of its wheat production. Major importing countries of Australian 
wheat are Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Egypt (Table 2). An 
interesting point to make here is that Australia has a logistical advantage over its major 
exporting  competitors  when  selling  wheat  to  Asia  and  the  Middle  East.  This  is  a  good 
indication that Australia has a diversified market portfolio and does not rely on any particular 
country for our exports.
Table 2. Importers of Australian Wheat (in kt)
1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00
Africa
Egypt 1320 1358 0 739 1665 735 1503 1124
Ethiopia 19 24 10 35 6 41 33 20
South Africa 32 0 0 412 349 161 234 239
Asia
Bangladesh 61 96 73 174 231 254 372 343
China 583 1338 584 2229 156 204 165 107
India 1050 0 0 0 1632 2189 296 173
Indonesia 974 1187 1162 1959 2369 2424 1414 2059
Japan 1114 1179 1254 1148 1256 1108 1147 1195
Korea 975 1246 629 703 687 768 1212 1181
Malaysia 647 687 588 798 631 671 874 800
Pakistan 217 43 72 233 1308 1039 1102 11876
Singapore 144 149 149 88 59 86 107 92
Sri Lanka 9 61 5 326 263 80 189 155
Thailand 82 176 105 243 255 315 308 251
Middle East
Bahrain 18 0 13 27 67 37 21 23
Iran 1119 2593 524 1879 3349 579 1663 1860
Iraq 105 335 102 50 815 1388 1269 2517
Kuwait 0 0 0 144 202 177 219 132
Oman 151 187 153 193 287 282 248 300
Qatar 44 44 39 40 64 36 61 22
UAE 229 232 188 226 457 289 0 462
Yemen 233 322 0 254 633 527 644 544
Oceania
Fiji 58 89 71 55 67 66 73 88
New Zealand 194 221 173 158 146 84 94 182
PNG 116 116 125 95 119 109 131 137
Total 9534 12910 7892 12056 18348 15245 16384 17274
Source: Australian Commodity Statistics, 2000. 
Another important statistic to look at when examining trading partners is the percentage of 
the market that Australia supplies. In 1998/99, Australia provided approximately 17% of the 
wheat to the world market. By comparison, USA, Canada, EU and Argentina have 31, 20, 16 
and 8% of market shares, respectively (Alisauskas, 1999). Also in this period, 49.2% of the 
wheat traded to the Iraqi market and 48% traded to Indonesia was provided by Australia. 
Similarly, Australia also provided close to 25% of the wheat to South Korea and Yemen in 
the same year (ABARE, 2000). From this it may be derived that although Australia has an 
insignificant share of the world wheat market they still have a significant share of some 
segments of the world market. This means that these markets may be somewhat dependent 
on  Australia  to  provide  wheat.  Consequently,  the  AWB’s  strategy  may  be  able  to  take 7
advantage  of  its  dominant  market  position  in  these  markets  by,  for  example,  pricing  to 
market. 
Australian Wheat Marketing
Australian wheat marketing system has been evolving since the establishment of the AWB in 
1939 to help stabilise wheat prices (Whitwell and Sydenham, 1991). The most significant 
changes  have  probably  occurred  since  1989  when  the  domestic  wheat  market  was 
deregulated allowing private grain traders to trade within Australia. However, the AWB still 
is the single desk seller.
The single desk selling system in Australia means that the AWB controls the exports of all 
the wheat from the country. This arrangement is established through government legislation 
under the Wheat Marketing Act 1989. Although there are now several grower-owned and 
private grain companies that trade domestically and can also export wheat in containers or 
bags, there is not much wheat that is exported in this manner. This is due to the higher costs 
of exporting in containers/bags compared to bulk shipments, and the transaction costs and 
time delay in applying for a permit from the Wheat Exchange Authority (WEA). As a result, 
the AWB still has a monopoly over the majority of wheat that are exported from the country. 
The  single  desk  selling  power  of  AWB  has  come  under  increased  pressures  from  both 
domestic and international players. On the domestic front the pressure comes mainly from 
the National Competition Policy and on the international front, from the WTO. In 2000, the 
Wheat Marketing Act of 1989 was reviewed to determine whether the single desk status of 
AWB has resulted in net public benefits. In its submission to the Review Committee, the 
AWB (2000a) claimed that the single desk has allowed it the ability to price discriminate and 
restrict supply, and therefore obtain price premiums. Opposition to the single desk argue that 
the price differentials or price premiums, if exist, do not necessarily reflect market power. 
Instead,  other  factors  such  as  seasonal  advantage  from  Australia  being  located  in  the 
Southern Hemisphere, transport advantages, quality differences and customer services are 
more important than merely being a single desk.
With numerous submissions from parties that are for and against the single desk, the Review 
Committee  concluded  that  there  was  insufficient  credible  and  unambiguous  evidence  to 
suggest that the current marketing arrangements for the marketing of export wheat generated 
net benefit to Australian wheat growers or the Australian community (Irving et al., 2000). 
Despite, the recommendations from the Review Committee, a decision by the government 
was to retain the single desk with possibility of the second round review in 2004 (Truss, 
2001). Although substantial changes to the legislation did not occur, the general view is that 8
public inquiries, such as the 2000 Review, have placed pressures on AWB to become more 
commercialised and more efficient in its operations (Irving et al., 2000). 
Another source of pressures for the removal of the single desk comes from overseas. Despite
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round trade talks the world supply of wheat remains heavily 
distorted by government subsidies as well as trade distorting single desks such as Australian 
and  Canadian  Wheat  Boards.  Trade  negotiations  under  the  WTO  rules  have  important 
implications for market support and subsidies that are used in the USA and EU, as well as the 
single  desk  selling  systems  in  Australia  and  Canada  (DeVos,  1997).  Further  trade 
liberalisation and reductions in government support to US and EU growers as trade talks 
continue mean that the  single desk selling  power  of the AWB would  be even harder to 
justified.
There are many arguments both for and against the single desk selling system and they are 
outlined below. The main argument for single desk, put forward mainly by AWB (2000a) 
and its supporters is the high levels of government intervention have heavily distorted the 
world wheat market. The AWB claim that because of these market distortions the world 
wheat market is not a level playing field, nor is it truly competitive.  The AWB believe that 
the single desk has enabled them to remain competitive in this imperfect market. 
Indeed, government interventions in the world wheat market have been prolific since World 
War II as governments perceived a need for food security. The government regulations that 
are most recognized and visible are price support programs and export subsidies in the USA 
and EU. However, these are not the only government supports in the world. Wheat growers 
in the other parts of the world, including Canada and Australia, also receive government 
support.  These  supports  can  be  measured  in  terms  of  the  percentage of  income  that  are 
provided by government subsidies. The percentages are 46, 58, 11 and 11 for USA, EU, 
Canada and Australia, respectively. This means that on average a wheat farmer in the USA 
receives 46% of the income from the government, compared to an Australian wheat farmer 
who receives 11% of income from the government.
Such figures highlight the enormity of government support in the US and EU. All of these 
government supports have the effect of increasing world production and therefore depressing 
world prices. 
It is also important to note that 80% of the world wheat market is controlled by a limited 
numbers  of  multinational  companies,  including  ADM,  Andre,  Bunge,  Cargill,  ConAgra, 
Glencore and Louis Dreyfus (PIBA, 2001). Given the relatively small size of the Australian 
market, the single desk allows more muscles to compete with these massive multinationals.9
Other arguments for the single desk are:
 Price discrimination through market power that allows them to charge higher prices for 
grain.
 The ability to run an effective price pooling system which offers farmers a form of risk 
management
 Developing of new markets through investing money into research and development
 Opportunity to negotiate on a level playing field with single desk buyers
 Taking advantage of economies of scale in handling and marketing of grain.
 Preventing weak selling or undercutting by other Australian exporters.
Among all the advantages put forward, only the market power has economical validity as it is 
argued by the opponents that private traders could supply the other potential benefits just as 
easily. As such, the proof of market power has been the focal point of the Review process.
The arguments against the single desk, put forward by the Allen Consulting Group (2000) 
and others, can be summarised as follows:
 Single desk selling restricts competition and decreases incentives to market innovation, 
which  result  in  inefficiencies  and  lower  returns  to  producers  and  higher  prices  for 
domestic users and consumers (Ryan, 1994). Grainco Australia estimated that up to $360 
million could have been saved if the AWB did not exert so much control over the system 
(Bolt, 2000).
 The single desk restricts grower’s choice of whom they sell their grains to, who handles 
their grains and provides them with price risk management and other marketing services. 
The fact that Australia does not have a liquid futures market means that wheat prices on 
the Sydney futures exchange are heavily influenced by the AWB pool estimates. This 
means that Australia is lacking a true domestic pricing mechanism.
The major benefits of the single desk, as summarised by AWB (2000b) and Lindberg (2000) 
are:  maximising  pool  returns  to  growers;  guaranteeing  access  for  all  growers  to  the 
international  markets;  capturing  significant  economics  of  scale  in  product  development, 
logistics, storage and handling; and obtaining a price premium for Australian wheat. The 
downsides are the loss of efficiency in the marketing system and re-distribution of incomes 
between market participants.10
However, AWB is not the only single desk exists in the world wheat market. In fact, the 
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) plays a similar role for Western Canadian wheat and barley 
growers in Canada. It too has single desk selling, pooling and government connections. The 
CWB has annual revenues of CDN $4 to $6 billion and is the largest exporter of wheat and 
barley  in  the  world  (CWB,  2001).  Like  the  AWB,  it  is  believed  that  the  CWB  gains 
additional benefit for the producer using their ability to price discriminate in international 
markets. And like AWB, it is under increasing pressures to be dismantled. Similar arguments 
are being put forward either to support or contest its single desk selling power (eg Brooks 
and Schmitz, 1998; DeVos, 1997; Carter and Wilson, 1999; Maginnis, 1999; Goldberg and 
Knetter, 1999). The US General Accounting Office (1992) investigated the AWB and CWB 
and  found  they  were  both  non-competitive  sellers  due  to  unfair  pricing,  pooling  and 
government underwriting (Carter and Wilson, 1999).
The Empirical Model
Market power in the case of the AWB is defined as the ability to price discriminate to earn 
more revenue. Price discrimination occurs when a single-desk seller differentiates its sales 
prices for comparable quality wheat between different destinations according to a country’s 
ability to pay and price sensitivity (AWB, 2000a). This means that the AWB faces markets 
with different price elasticities and is able to charge more in markets that have less elastic 
demand. The National Competition Policy Review of the Wheat Marketing Act 1989 has 
been based  mainly on  determining whether price  premiums  exist  in  key  export  markets. 
These analyses are based on hedonic pricing models (AWB, 2000a; Gans and Hirschber, 
2000), and simulations (Allen Consulting Group, 2000).  Co-integration techniques have also 
been used to test the market power hypothesis (Berry, 2000).  
Another simple definition of market power is that the supplier is facing a downward sloping 
demand curve. This means a firm has the ability to influence price it receives by varying 
quantity of supply. In this study, an attempt was made to test the market power of the AWB 
by determined whether it faces a downward sloping demand curve in the export market. The 
basic idea is that if the demand curve for Australian wheat in the international market is 
downward sloping, then as Australian exports increase, the export price will decrease. In this 
study,  we  examine  factors  that  influence  the  price  of  Australian  wheat  exports  and  the 
linkages between export quantities and export prices of Australian wheat.
Following Gardner (1999), the empirical model is specified as follows:
(1)  Pt =  + 1 Qat + β2 St-1 + β3 Qwt + β4 D  + β5 T + β6 It + εt,11
where
P = the price or unit value of Australian wheat exports;
Qa = the quantity of wheat exported from Australia;
S = the quantity of stocks in the world market;
Qw = the quantity of wheat produced in the world;
D = a dummy variable that takes on value 1 for years between 1960 and 1973; 0, otherwise;
T = time trend;
I = the value of imports of all agricultural commodities in the world; and
ε = the error term that is assumed to be distributed with mean zero and constant variance.
Equation (1) states that the export price of Australian wheat in a particular year is determined 
by the quantity of Australian wheat exports in that year, as well as the quantity of ending 
stocks in the world market in the year before, the total world wheat production and the value 
of total world imports in the same year. The dummy variable is used to capture the structural 
change in wheat prices before and after 1973 as a result of changes in international trade and 
policy changes. The time trend is included as a proxy to capture other factors that might have 
caused  changes  in  wheat  prices  over  time  but  not  been  included  in  the  model,  such  as 
changes in consumer preferences away from, or towards, wheat-based products. 
The main interest of the study is to test the hypothesis whether changes in the Australian 
wheat exports have an impact on prices received. In other words, we are interested in testing 
whether coefficient 1 is statistically significantly different from zero. Specifically, the null 
hypothesis to be stated is:
H0 : 1 = 0, 
against the alternative hypothesis
HA : 1  0.
The estimated coefficient for the world ending stocks (St-1) is expected to be negative which 
means the higher the stock level the lower the price; similarly for world wheat production 
(Qw). Both estimated coefficients are expected to be negative because the Australian export 
price is expected to decrease as the world supply of wheat increases. The value of imports in 
the world (I) was added to the model to serve as a proxy for the health of the world economy. 
The estimated coefficient for this variable is expected to be positive as one would expect as 12
“incomes”  or  “total  expenditures”  for  agricultural  commodities  increase,  the  demand  for 
wheat will increase, which, in turn, leads to an increase in the price of wheat. 
In addition to testing the hypothesis that changes in Australian exports may result in changes 
in export prices, it is further hypothesised that the impact of Australian wheat exports on 
prices, if exists, may have changed over time. This is of interest because Australia has gained 
a much larger share of the export market in recent years; therefore, it is reasonable to expect 
that AWB’s ability to influence prices, if exists, may have increased. In this time-varying 
parameter  framework,  the  1  coefficient  in  equation  (1)  is  hypothesised  to  change  with 
Australia’s export share (QR) in the world market. That is, 
(2) 1 = a + b QR,
where QR= Qa/Qwx and Qwx = the quantity of wheat that is exported in the world.
Combining equation (1) and (2), we get
(3)  Pt =  + (a + b QR) Qat + β2 St-1 + β3 Qwt + β4 D  + β5 T + β6 It + εt.
Rearranging equation (3), we get
(4)  Pt =  + a Qat + b (QR*Qa)t + β2 St-1 + β3 Qwt + β4 D  + β5 T + β6 It + εt.
In this case, we have an extra interaction term, compared to equation (1). It indicates that the 
price response to quantity changes is no longer constant, but varies with the export share of 
the Australian wheat in the world market. All the variables on the right-hand side of equation 
(4) are all exogenous, including Australian export quantities (Qa). As such, equation (4) is 
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares.   
Data and Data Sources
All of the data were obtained from the Australian Commodities Statistics (ABARE, 2000), 
except for the value of total imports of agricultural commodities which was obtained from 
the Monthly International Financial Statistics published by the International Monetary Fund. 
A summary of the statistics for the variables used is given in Table 3 below. The quantity 
Australia exports (Qa), is expressed in kilo metric tonnes; the quantity of world production 
(Qw) and the quantity of stocks (S) in the world are expressed in mega metric tonnes; and the 
variable I, the quantity of international imports, is expressed in billions of US dollars.
Table 3. Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation13
Qa 10145 4137 19189 3893.4
Qw 431.45 227 610 118.39
S 111.17 67 176 27.31
I 0.2095E+07 0.1246E+06 0.6508E+07 0.193E+0714
Estimated results
Because autocorrelation was detected in the preliminary analysis based on Ordinary Least 
Squares, equation (4) was re-estimated using iterative Cochrane-Orcutt estimation procedure 
(AUTO)  available  in  SHAZAM  (White,  1996).  The  estimated  results  from  AUTO  are 
presented in Table 4. 




















*Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.
The  R²  from  AUTO  estimation  indicates  that  90%  of  the  variation  in  export  price  of 
Australian wheat can be explained by the variables included. The signs for the explanatory 
variables were as expected except for the value of imports in the world. However, not all the 
estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The key variable for the analysis is the quantity of Australian exports, Qa. The coefficients 
associated with Qa, parameters a and b in equation (4), are both statistically insignificant at 
the 5% level. These results mean that the Australian export price is not affected by the export 
quantity, nor by changes in the export share. This result is different from the finding of 
Gardner (1999) that showed that Canada’s additional exports of 0.2 % of the world supply 
would drive down the world price by 6%. These results may suggest that the Canadian and 
Australian Wheat Boards may have differing market positions in the world wheat market.15
The quantity of stocks in the world and the world production are statistically significant at 
the 5% level, indicating that these two variables are important determinants of Australian 
export prices. In flexibility terms, they are estimated to be –0.43 and -1.86, respectively 
(Table 5). This means that a 1% increase in the stock would result in a 0.43% decrease in the 
price of Australian exports and that a 1% increase in the quantity of world wheat production 
would  result  in  a  1.86%  decrease  in  the  price  of  Australian  wheat  export.  Negative 
relationship between export prices and stock levels can be seen in Figure 4.
The  value  of  commodity  imports  in  the  world  also  was  found  not  to  be  an  important 
determinant of Australian export prices of wheat because the estimated coefficient is not only 
small but also statistically insignificant at the 5% level. The impacts on prices of various 
quantity  variables  are  expressed  in  flexibility  terms,  evaluated  at  sample  means,  and 
presented in Table 5. As can be seen, total world wheat production appears to be the most 
influential factor in determining export prices of Australian wheat, followed by the level of 
the stock. 





Recall that the impact of Australian export on price is assumed to vary with Australia’s 
export share in the world market, flexibility estimates (defined as the percentage change in 
the price with respect to a one percent change in the quantity) are calculated based on the 
formula defined in equation (2) and shown in Figure 6. The signs for these flexibilities are as 
expected  as  they are all  negative.  A  negative  sign  means  that  the  more  wheat  Australia 
exports the lower the price will be for Australian wheat export. The fact that they are on an 
upward trend implies that the price impact is becoming smaller (in absolute terms) over time. 
This means that as Australia’s export share increased, as it did in the past decades, the export 
price is less affected by changes in export quantities (the inverse demand curve is becoming 
flatter). This latter result can be interpreted as an increase in market power since Australia is 
able to export more without the need to reduce prices too much, other things being equal. As 
none of the coefficients used to calculate these flexibilities are statistically significant at the 
5% level, these results are presented for completeness only and should be interpreted with 16
caution. Nevertheless, they do lend support to the conclusion that the AWB cannot influence 
the export price of Australian wheat by varying the quantity of exports, nor does it have any 
market power in the world market. By comparison, the results confirm previous observations 
that for storable commodities, the quantity of stock in the world has a significant negative 
effect on the prices. It was also shown that the quantity of wheat produced in the world had 
an even greater negative effect on those prices. 
Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to test the market power hypothesis of AWB by estimating 
the  relationship  between  the  quantity  of  Australia  wheat  exports  and  the  export  prices. 
Proponents of the single desk argue that the AWB can price discriminate because of its size 
and associated market power that allows it to gain overall price premiums for wheat sold. If 
this is so there is still a question over whether this is beneficial to the farmer and the general 
public. The full premium must be returned to the grower and it cannot be at the expense of 
the  general  public,  which  includes  consumers  and  other  grain  traders  within  Australia. 
However, rather than examining the price premium issues associated with the single desk as 
in  Australian  Wheat  Board  (2000a)  and  the  Allen  Consulting  Group  (2000),  this  paper 
examines the ability of the AWB to influence export price by varying the amount of exports. 
The analysis was conducted based on an econometric model using annual data from the last 
40 years relating to the Australian and world wheat markets. The results showed that there is 
not  enough  evidence  to  suggest  that  an  increase  in  Australian  exports  would  cause  any 
changes to the Australian exports prices. Therefore, the conclusion was that the AWB does 
not have the market power or the ability to influence prices in the world wheat market.
If the AWB hopes to retain the single desk selling arrangements they must prove that they do 
have market power and it is in the public interest that such power is maintained if the Wheat 
Marketing Act 1989 is to be reviewed again in 2004. Given the political climate both at home 
and  overseas,  it  is  essential  that  concrete  evidence  and  strongest  arguments  can  be  put 
forward for the retention of the single desk. Failing to do that, then there is a very good 
chance that the Australian wheat industry will be totally deregulated in foreseeable future. 
One  major  limitation  of  the  analysis  is  the  aggregate  nature  of  the  data  used  in  the 
econometric analysis. Specifically, the data do not take into consideration differences in the 
quality of wheat and marketing conditions in the importing countries. If data were available 
for different wheat grades destined for different markets, it may be possible to demonstrate 
more conclusively whether AWB has some market power in certain markets where Australia 
has significant market shares and unique products.17
Another limitation to the study is that the market power, as well as associated price premium, 
argument is only one of several arguments relating to the viability of the single desk selling 
system in Australia. Other arguments in favour of deregulation are:
 The  AWB’s  handling  and  administration  costs  would  be  lower  in  a  competitive 
environment; 
 The price to users of domestic wheat would fall;
 The flow of information would improve; 
 There would be increased innovation, flexibility and development of niche markets;
 Financial risk management options would improve; and
 Social effects may be positive, if for example there were more then one marketer in 
town.
(Irving, Arney & Lindner, 2000).
As  such,  the  analysis  provides  only  a  limited  perspective  into  a  very  complex  issue. 
Nevertheless,  the  methodology  used  here  appears  to  offer  some  additional  insights  and 
contribute to the on-going debate on the single desk selling system.18
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